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Background: Clinical deterioration and adverse events in hospitals is an increasing cause for concern. Rapid 
response systems have been widely implemented to identify deteriorating patients.  
 
Aim: We aimed to examine the literature highlighting major historical trends leading to widespread adoption of 
rapid response systems, focussing on Australian issues and identifying future focus areas.  
 
Method: Integrative literature review including published and grey literature  
 
Results:  Seventy-eight sources including journal articles and Australian government materials resulted. Pertinent 
themes were the increasing acuity and aging of the population, importance of hospital cultures, the emerging role of 
the consumer, and proliferation, evolution and standardisation of rapid response systems. 
 
Discussion: Translating evidence to usual care practice is challenging and is strongly driven by local factors and 
political imperatives.  
 
Conclusion:  
Rapid response systems are complex interventions requiring consideration of contextual factors at all levels. 
Appropriate resources, skilled workforce and positive workplace cultures are needed for these systems to reach 
their full potential.  
 
Impact Statement: The RRS model is evolving and adapting to practice models. Considering contextual factors and 
patient, provider and health system elements are crucial for ensuring intervention fidelity.  
 
 



















Internationally, there is widespread interest in developing rapid response systems (RRS) to identify individuals at risk 
of clinical deterioration (Shappell, Snyder, Edelson, Churpek, & Investigators, 2018).    Contemporary hospital wards 
are dangerous environments for patients due to the risk of adverse events and iatrogenic complications (Douglas, 
Robinson, & Fahy, 2001; Ulrich, Zimring, Joseph, & Choudhary, 2004; Wilson et al., 1995). This is particularly true as 
the population ages, resulting in greater numbers of elderly patients, many presenting with multiple co-morbidities 
(Pham et al., 2012).  
 
Patients in the contemporary ward environment are now at higher risk of adverse clinical events than ever before as 
incidence of undetected deterioration and failure to escalate the deteriorating patient continue. From 2007–08 to 
2011–12, Australian hospitalisations linked to adverse events increased from 4.8 to 5.3 per 100 (The Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014). Today, intensive care, high dependency and coronary care units continue to 
house our sickest patients enabling more aggressive, invasive and extensive management regimens. What has 
changed over time is the acuity and complexity of the admitted general ward/unit patient in our acute care hospitals 
(Driscoll A, Currey J, Allen, George M, & Davidson, 2014). Historical trends in the reduction of length of stay over the 
past few decades suggest that patients admitted to acute health facilities are generally of higher acuity, as ‘well’ 
patients are now discharged earlier and may have ongoing care regimes and follow up in community and outpatient 
settings (The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013).  The number of separations for people aged 85 and 
over increased by 41% over the period 2006–07 to 2010–11, an average annual increase of 8.6% and most of these 
separations were for acute care (87%) or rehabilitation care (8%) (The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2013). 
 
This rising acuity of the general ward patient often occurs with increasing nurse to patient ratios and an increasingly 
diverse nursing skill mix.  Interest in identifying deteriorating patients is driven by the need to reduce adverse 
events. (Winters & Pham, 2011). System process failures leading to adverse clinical events have not only been 





The purpose of this paper was to examine the literature highlighting major historical trends in managing the 
deteriorating patient internationally. The guiding question of this review was to identify the state of the science, 
describe the socio-political context and identify drivers for model implementation within the Australian context.    
 
Method 
As data was sought from a diverse range of sources, the method of integrative review was chosen to allow synthesis 
of a wide range of concepts and themes pertaining to the evidence for implementation (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005).  
In addition to scholarly research studies, the inclusion of guidelines, statistics, government documents and 
commissioned enquiries were essential in describing the development, evolution and justification of the RRS. The 
systematic review process was not chosen due to the requirement for content primarily consisting of experimental 
research and strict adherence to methodological process, limiting the scope of discussion of the paper (Moher, 
Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2010). Both the grey literature and published, peer reviewed data sources and the 
electronic data bases Medline, Embase, Cochrane database of systematic reviews, CINAHL and Pubmed were 
searched using the terms ‘medical emergency team’, ‘rapid response system’, ‘ rapid response team’, ‘deteriorating 
patients’, ‘early warning score’ and ‘Australia’. The chosen search period 1996 to present allowed for inclusion of 
seminal RRS studies. The initial search returned 119 articles (Figure 1). Sixty eight articles were rejected for either 
their direct irrelevance to the research topic or duplication. Inclusion of the remaining articles was based on the 
impact and importance of primary resources and research papers around patient deterioration in the Australian 
setting and their relevance to the emerging themes and discussions presented in the paper. Hand searching of 
retrieved material was also undertaken. Searches of the World Wide Web were conducted using Google and Google 
Scholar search engines to obtain further information including data from international, national and state 
government health sources. Articles were then reviewed and summarised according to model elements using the 
method of an integrative review. Elements were categorised by both chronology and/or theme to allow narrative 





The search strategy generated 76 sources, 51 journal articles were identified, 7 of which were systematic reviews. In 
addition, 21 Australian government sources were also identified consisting of 17 federal and state resources and 
four state initiated commissions of inquiry into health system failures. International policy and professional 
organisations were also included to provide a contextual backdrop particularly pertaining to evidence generation. 
These data were integrated and synthesised using a discursive method to provide a snapshot of contemporaneous 
issues allowing departure and exploration from the main topics to cover a varying range of subjects relating to RRS 
literature (Gale, 2010).  The changing patient population, systemic growth, evolution and standardisation of 
implementation methods, influence of hospital cultures and the emerging role of the consumer in rapid response 
emerged as key themes from narrative analysis. As health care becomes increasingly politicized considering the 
deteriorating patient in the local context is important. Although international studies have been reviewed to identify 
evidence and trends in the RRS, this manuscript focuses on implications for the Australian health care system 
 
Rapid Response Systems  
Rapid response systems seek to implement systematic processes to prevent delays in recognising and responding to 
clinical deterioration (Hillman & Braithwaite, 2014). RRS use the principles of early detection through predefined 
indicators of clinical deterioration and response. The most common terms given to clinicians who respond to rapid 
response activations include medical emergency teams (MET), rapid response teams, and critical care outreach 
teams (Salamonson, Heere, Everett, & Davidson, 2006).  Within acute settings, these teams are outsourced in a 
variety of ways, most typically from critical care units such as intensive care, coronary care or a mixture of both and 
usually consist of a senior medical officer and critical care nurse/s. Historically these teams were designated ‘cardiac 
arrest teams’ and were initiated when a patient was either pre or in an actual arrest state. These roles are now 
evolving to become decentralised from their ‘home’ critical care units, increasingly focusing on involvement in ward 
patient clinical management when signs of deterioration are first evident (Hillman, 2008; Hillman et al., 2005).  
 
Winters and colleagues undertook a systematic review and meta-analysis of articles reporting outcomes of rapid 
response systems (Winters et al., 2007). Of the studies included in the review, 5 used historical controls, 1 
concurrent controls, and 2 a cluster randomized design. The pooled relative risk for hospital mortality comparing 
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rapid response teams to control was 0.76 (95% confidence interval, 0.39 –1.48) between the two randomized 
studies and 0.87 (95% confidence interval, 0.73–1.04) among the five observational studies. The pooled relative risk 
for cardiac arrest comparing rapid response systems to control was 0.94 (95% confidence interval, 0.79 –1.13) in the 
single randomized study and 0.70 (95% confidence interval, 0.56–0.92) in four observational studies.  The 
heterogeneity of study designs was an important consideration of this systematic review.    
 
A further systematic review was undertaken by Chan (Chan, Jain, Nallmothu, Berg, & Sasson, 2010). The review 
incorporated data on nearly 1.3 million hospital admissions. Implementation of a rapid response team in adults was 
associated with a 33.8% reduction in rates of cardiopulmonary arrest outside the intensive care unit (relative risk 
[RR], 0.66; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.54-0.80) but was not associated with lower hospital mortality rates (RR, 
0.96; 95% CI, 0.84-1.09). In a paediatric population, the use of rapid response teams was associated with a 37.7% 
reduction in rates of cardiopulmonary arrest outside the intensive care unit (ICU) (RR, 0.62; 95% CI, 0.46-0.84) and a 
21.4% reduction in hospital mortality rates (RR, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.63-0.98) (Chan et al., 2010). This review also found 
evidence that deaths were prevented out of proportion to reductions in cases of cardiopulmonary arrest, raising 
questions about mechanisms of improvement.  In spite of this limited evidence for mortality reduction in many 
settings, rapid response systems became a standard of care throughout Australia. This expansion may have been led 
by the absence of conclusive evidence for mortality reduction being insufficient to discard the routine application of 
these systems.   
 
Though reducing cardiac arrest rates is an extremely important indicator of RRS success, some argue that overall 
end point mortality rates may not be the most appropriate measure with which to analyse the effectiveness of this 
model (Hillman & Braithwaite, 2014).  Emerging data suggests that mortality depends more upon the nature of the 
patients underlying clinical state and type of interventions they receive rather than being a measure of hospital 
safety and effectiveness of rapid response systems  (Hillman & Braithwaite, 2014) (Shappell et al., 2018).  More 
recent studies however have actually shown increasing trends to decreased mortality. Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2014) 
compared in-hospital cardiac arrest, in-hospital cardiac arrest related mortality and overall hospital mortality rates 
between a hospital with a mature rapid response system against three other similar centres without an existing 
formal system. While the overall mortality rate did not change for the hospital with a long standing rapid response 
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system in place, there was a significant reduction in in-hospital cardiac arrest rates (50% lower), in-hospital cardiac 
arrest related mortality (40% lower) and lower overall hospital mortality (6% lower) for the centres that previously 
did not have a rapid response system (Chen et al., 2014).  
 
Results of RRS studies to date are still diverse and contentious despite their widespread adoption (Jones, DeVita, & 
Bellomo, 2011; Ranji, Auerbach, & Hurd, 2007). This can likely be explained by methodological variation within the 
clinical trials and the challenges of implementing complex interventions. However, in advancing the science of 
systems for RRS, it is also important to consider structural characteristics of various models and their adaptability to 
individual healthcare organisations. Poor resourcing, model design and implementation could impact on the uptake 
and long term success of the rapid response system.  
 
Rapid response criteria 
Track and trigger systems are formalised processes that employ periodic vital sign measures (track) with a 
predetermined action (trigger) when the measures are breached. (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Healthcare, 2009) The Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory use numerical scoring with a Modified 
Early Warning Score (MEWS) system (Australian Capital Territory Health, 2009) to track clinical deterioration. The 
majority of other Australian states however employ vital sign parameter calling criteria as a track for initiating rapid 
response such as that used by NSW ’Between the Flags program (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2009a).  
 
Hillman and colleagues (Hillman et al., 2005) investigating the antecedents to hospital deaths and the role of a 
medical emergency team in the ‘MERIT’ study began a series of primary research studies into acute inpatient 
deterioration that have led to Australia being a contemporary global leader in the field of model development in this 
area. Hillman’s work around vital sign parameters for medical emergency teams began in the 1990’s originating at 
Sydney’s Liverpool Hospital resulting in the creation of calling criteria that is still current as the primary criteria for 
activating many Australian rapid response systems. In 2005 Jacques (Jacques, Harrison, McLaws, & Kilborn, 2006) 
conducted a follow on study, ‘signs of critical conditions and emergency responses (SOCCER), testing the efficacy of 
vital sign parameters established in the MERIT study in an attempt to further distinguish early from late signs of 
deterioration. This cross-sectional survey looked at 3,046 adult patients in five hospitals over a two week period. Of 
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these patients, the existence of 26 early signs of deterioration (critical condition and adverse events) were found in 
n=12,384 instances and 21 late signs were identified in n=1,410 cases. Pulse oximetry was not part of the initial 
measures for calling criteria with early medical emergency team activation, but SOCCER found that decreasing 
saturations were evident in both early (SpO2 90-95%) and late (SpO2 <90%) signs with increased risk of death. 




The worried or concerned criterion is an essential element of any rapid response system (M. DeVita et al., 2010; 
Santiano et al., 2009). For many years the nursing literature has discussed nurses as having an intuitive feeling that 
‘something is just not quite right’ or patients ‘have that look about them’ (Cioffl, 2008; King & Appleton, 1997; 
McCutcheon & Pincombe, 2001). The worried criterion taps into this subjective patient assessment, acknowledging 
that nurses also possess their own unique sets of assessment skills. This criterion also covers all assessment aspects 
and events not relating directly to objective vital sign parameter breaches. The criterion was designed to empower 
nurses to escalate a patient’s care by requiring a medical response within a specified timeframe. The potential exists 
therefore, to also be a possible tool for inter professional manipulation if not utilised appropriately. The literature 
reports on barriers and facilitators to nurses adopting rapid response systems (Astroth, Woith, Stapleton, Degitz, & 
Jenkins, 2013; Jones et al., 2006). This same literature however is scant when reporting on the possible existence of 
issues such as nurses manipulating their medical colleagues with ‘threats’ of initiating rapid response if they are not 
satisfied with current management plans. Future studies with a strong focus on the cultural use of these systems 
may help to determine the existence or absence of changing professional balance between medical officers and 
nurses as a result of working within these systems. 
 
Australian government commissions of enquiry and inquests 
The need to mandate RRS across all national health facilities stemmed from commissions of enquiry initiated several 
high profile incidents occurring within the Australian health system (Douglas et al., 2001; Garling, 2008; Queensland 
Government, 2011). High rates of preventable adverse events have raised the attention of health professionals and 
policy makers alike. In the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW), a sequence of well-publicised adverse clinical 
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events and growing public disquiet led to the Special Commissions of Inquiry into acute care services in NSW public 
hospitals (Garling, 2008; Walker, 2004). The Garling Report (Garling, 2008) made 139 recommendations, many 
addressing increased protection of patients, commentary on the nursing role and an increased emphasis on clinical 
cares including models of care utilised in our contemporary acute care facilities. Many in hospital failures 
documented in the extant literature also emerged as findings in the Garling Report. One major recommendation led 
to the mandated introduction of RRS for managing deteriorating patients including clinician education in all NSW 
public hospitals (Garling, 2008). Despite widespread implementation the continued occurrence of reportable critical 
incidents relating to adverse clinical events in ward patients suggests there are still process failures within these RRS 
systems.  
 
Non-clinician escalation models for the deteriorating patient in Australia have not been a concept previously leading 
to mass appeal or widespread adoption. Recently however, a strong move to incorporate consumer and family 
activation into our rapid response models has occurred. In the Australian state of Queensland, the Office of the 
State Coroner’s inquest findings into the death of Ryan Charles Saunders, (Queensland Government, 2011) a child 
who died of toxic shock syndrome, was instrumental in mandating a state wide process within the Queensland 
health system allowing for consumer and family escalation of care (Queensland Health, 2014). The Clinical 
Excellence Commission in NSW is also working with acute public health facilities to integrate consumer and family 
activation into its ‘Between the Flags’ rapid response model through the ‘REACH’ program (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2012b). At national level, National Safety and Quality Health Standard (NSQHS) ‘Standard 9: 
Recognising and Responding to Clinical Deterioration, element 9.9 Mechanisms in place for patient / family/carer to 
escalate care response’ (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, 2012) will require all Australian 
acute care facilities to adopt this initiative into their rapid response programs in order to meet requirements for 
national accreditation. The foundation has now been set by the NSQHS to mandate processes for empowering 
patients, families and carers to enable escalation of care.  
 
Consumers are now generally experiencing a more integrated clinician, patient and family centred approach to the 
acute inpatient journey within the Australian healthcare setting. Led by initiatives such as the NSW Clinical 
Excellence Commission’s ‘In Safe Hands’ program, (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2012a) local governance is being 
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diverted to the grass roots ward level. This includes the involvement of the patient and family in the multi-
disciplinary bedside clinical handover, inviting patients and their families to become more involved in medical 
management plans and decision making, with great relevance to deterioration and end of life discussions and care 
(Clinical Excellence Commission, 2012b).  
. 
 
Progression to large scale Rapid Response Programs in Australia 
For many years, the implementation of RRS was inconsistent with institutions across Australia designing and running 
their own programs. The late 2000’s saw the development and implementation of large scale programs for the first 
time, encompassing multiple sites over vast geographical areas. Two differing foundation models created the scene 
that set momentum for large government initiated schemes to follow around the nation.  
 
Compass  
Both the Australian Capital and Northern Territories adopted territory wide programs labelled ‘Compass’, 
(Australian Capital Territory Health, 2008) a modified version of  the early warning score system (EWS) used in the 
United Kingdom  (Royal College of Physicians, 2015).  The modified early warning score (MEWS) utilises numerical 
scores to calculate a patient’s acuity based upon pre-determined vital sign parameters (Australian Capital Territory 
Health, 2009; Subbe, Kruger, Rutherford, & Gimmel, 2001). Scores are allocated according to how far a patients vital 
signs are seen as being deranged from a pre-determined set of parameters. The Compass program is assisted by an 
online learning and a training manual. 
 
Between the Flags (BTF) and Patient with Acute Condition for Escalation (PACE)  
In 2009, NSW rolled out a state wide initiative developed by NSW Health’s quality pillar (Clinical Excellence 
Commission), which saw the implementation of a major rapid response program labelled ‘Between the Flags’ 
(Clinical Excellence Commission, 2009a). The aim, to deliver standardisation of one rapid response program across 
the entire state incorporating all public healthcare centres within a diverse range of clinical settings. The red and 
yellow zones (tiers) of the program reflect surf life saver flags at the beach whereby a patient who’s clinical 
parameters sit between the ‘flags’ (i.e. a non-coloured zone) is considered to be safe, those outside of this safe zone 
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are considered at increased risk of deterioration. The BTF design was primarily suited to the medical emergency 
team concept in acute centres, but is capable of being interchangeable with other rapid response models and can be 
modified to meet lesser resourced centres such as those found in rural and remote areas.  
 
Although there was intent of a ‘one model state’, NSW actually housed two of the largest programs in Australia at 
the time of BTF introduction. Former NSW Health’s South East Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service’ ‘Patient with 
Acute Condition for Escalation’ (PACE) program also co-existed (South East Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service, 
2009).  These two programs differed in their approach to rapid response model design. Most large acute sites using 
the BTF model utilised a first line rapid response/medical emergency team outsourced from a critical care unit while 
PACE utilised the patient’s admitting medical team as first line response. Over time, PACE adopted the BTF vital 
signs chart and calling criteria, though most PACE centres still use these tools within their admitting team model.  
 
Heterogeneity of implementation models. 
Despite aiming for standardised RRS processes, model diversity still exists both between and within Australian 
states.  Single and multi-tiered, aggregated scoring and vital sign parameter activation, critical care and non-critical 
care led first line response give rise to debate as to the effectiveness of one model over another.  
  
Gao et al. conducted a systematic review of the reliability and validity of physiological track and trigger systems (Gao 
et al., 2007). They examined 36 papers containing 25 different systems. Outcome measures for all studies were 
similar, death, admission to a critical care unit or not for resuscitation orders. The investigators however found low 
sensitivity in these outcomes (median quartile 43.3) along with low predictive values (median quartile 36.7). It was 
conclusive that there was little evidence of reliability, validity or utility within the studies they examined. The low 
sensitivity was explained as possibly being due in part to the nature of the physiology monitored, or perhaps the 
threshold value of the trigger itself. The study could not identify one type of track and trigger system to be better 
than another. Another systematic review by Smith et al. looking at the performance of aggregate weighted track and 
trigger systems was also inconclusive, once again pointing out inconsistency around physiological components of the 
systems (Smith, Prytherch, & Schmit, 2008).  
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Scrutiny around the use of early warning score systems such as the modified system (MEWS) utilised in the ACT/NT 
also leaves some doubt to their effectiveness as the ultimate design for rapid response. Although utilised widely in 
the United Kingdom, scoring systems can be more complicated than simple observation parameter criteria, there is 
also potential for inaccurate calculation (Australian Capital Territory Health, 2009; McGaughey et al., 2007). 
Comparative effectiveness of RRS and the impact each may have on patient clinical outcomes requires further 
exploration. Until it is determined which model, if any, is the most optimal in assisting with early recognition and 
prevention of further clinical deterioration, then it is left to government policy and personal preference to decide. 
 
The primary aim of rapid response models that use a non-critical care unit based approach (such as the admitting 
medical team) is skill enhancement of both medical and nursing staff directly responsible for patients care. As first 
line, their responsibility is to not only detecting deterioration, but to assess and implement management plans 
themselves rather than handing this responsibility to an ‘outside’ medical emergency team in the first instance. 
Critical care unit based teams are generally unfamiliar with the ward patient and their history, nor do they routinely 
continue with direct care after the acute event has past. Evidence that these models do in fact increase the skills and 
knowledge of the patients own primary care clinicians does not however currently have enough weighted research 
to draw on a definitive conclusion to the argument. The possibility may exist that some clinicians do not acquire or 
increase their assessment skills within this type of model environment, which may lead to a ‘fall back’ to, and in 
some cases a possible delay in rapid response activation or escalation to a critical care team assessment. 
 
Advocates of the medical emergency team (critical care unit) based approach would argue that as core business, 
critical care teams deal with unstable patients on a daily basis and are therefore best equipped with both the 
knowledge and skills to manage those who are deteriorating in the ward environment (Buist et al., 2002; DeVita et 
al., 2004). Identified as a disadvantage in the MERIT study in reference to the medical emergency team model, was 
the significant increase in the number of ‘call outs’ to the general wards/units that the team received as a 
consequence of ward patients breaching rapid response criteria. In today’s landscape of tight clinical budgets, few 
critical care led teams would have the luxury of additional ‘floating staff’. Significant logistical resource strain on 
their personnel most likely occurs when required to leave their own patients and units in order to attend those 
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requiring assistance in the ward setting. Centres that use ICU liaison nurses or nurse led teams would face the same 
issues if not adequately resourced specifically for that purpose (Elliot, Chaboyer, Ernest, Doric, & Endacott, 2012).  
 
Jones et al. led a team of investigators looking into the composition and resourcing of rapid response teams in 
Australian hospitals (The ANZICS-CORE MET dose Investigators, 2011). Of the 39 sites studied, all had a 24hour 
service but only 25% of these teams were funded, meaning that resources had to be taken away from other areas in 
order to operate the teams. The investigators also found significant variation in team composition. An interesting 
point was very few rapid response teams were led by an Admitting/Consultant Medical Officer, the majority were 
intensive care fellows/registrars with the most senior nurses coming from both intensive and coronary care units. As 
the changing role of the old cardiac arrest team continues to evolve, resourcing requirements will also need to shift 
away from a focus on advanced life support and the resuscitation team to that of early intervention and rapid 
response teams.  In order to function effectively as early interceptors of clinical deterioration, they will need 
appropriate resourcing of staff, equipment and technology as well as tailored education and training. 
 
Standardisation  
Whilst the Australian Commission on Safety & Quality in Healthcare (ACSQHC) released standardised national 
guideline recommendations for RRS, (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, 2010) data 
collection and analysis around these systems remains inconsistent, both between and within our states and 
territories. Key performance indicators in NSW for example are reported from all acute facilities to the Ministry of 
Health on both cardiac arrest and rapid response rates. These data do not necessarily accurately reflect or compare 
true clinical activity, especially where differing rapid response models are being measured against the same KPIs. 
Medical emergency team facilities report their rapid response figures based on critical care team call out rates. 
Those facilities utilising admitting care team responder models only utilise the critical care based teams in their 
facilities if higher level escalation is required. Therefore, these types of models appear to be under activating & 
reporting on their rapid response systems.  
 
Cardiac arrest rates in Australian facilities are also a likely underestimation of actual figures, as areas such as 
emergency departments, operating theatres and intensive care units often manage their arrests ‘in house’. Formal 
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activation of a medical emergency team to these areas means arrest data may not be as accurately captured or 
reported in the entire hospital data.  
 
Non-standardisation of definitions is also an issue of contention. Cardiac arrest for example is not standardised in 
facilities across Australia. Some report this by definition only as ‘absence of cardiac output’, reporting all other 
medical emergencies including respiratory only arrests separately. Others may include cardiorespiratory arrests 
under the same data set for reporting purposes. In 2012, the Australian Resuscitation Council changed the definition 
to ‘…combination of unresponsiveness and absent or abnormal breathing’ (The Australian Resuscitation Council, 
2010). Regardless of the measures implemented, contextual issues, such as patient case mix, staffing levels and 
clinician skill mix are not considered or cross referenced during analysis of these events, which may offer more 
accurate insight into real world system process failures and successes. 
 
Elements of national standardisation are progressively occurring. The ACSQHC national consensus statement on 
essential elements for recognising and responding to clinical deterioration (The Australian Resuscitation Council, 
2010) was released in 2011. Further, production of the Australian Council Healthcare Standards (ACHS) occurred in 
2013. ‘Standard 9: Recognising and Responding to Clinical Deterioration in the Acute Health Care Setting’ (Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, 2012) assists all Australian facilities to achieve accreditation 
relating to deteriorating patient systems. ACSQHC and Queensland Health also developed and endorsed a ‘national’ 
vital signs chart (Hill, Horswill, Preece, & Watson, 2010). Using a combination of vital sign parameters and numerical 





Implementation of educational strategies to increase clinician skills around deterioration and effectively support 
their roles within RRS has also occurred within the Australian healthcare setting (Australian Capital Territory Health, 
2008; Clinical Excellence Commission, 2009b). Standard curriculum for most courses includes physical assessment 
concepts, detection, management and escalation of the deteriorating patient as well as communication and clinical 
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handover strategies. A variety of media modalities are utilised in the delivery of these education programs. Hands 
on, high and low fidelity simulation is perhaps regarded as one of the most useful forms of educational delivery, 
although it’s effectiveness as a teaching tool still requires further study (Harder, 2010). These practical programs are 
also often backed up with eLearning  (Australian Capital Territory Health, 2008; Clinical Excellence Commission, 
2009b). Clinical handover initiatives are also developing around Australia creating models to improve clinician 
communication. We are seeing strategies such as the return of bedside clinical handover with multidisciplinary 
clinician, patient and carer input to help plan better care around the patient’s hospital journey (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2012a).  
 
Despite an increasing emphasis placed on education to increase RRS success, it does not necessarily ensure 
understanding, acceptance, compliance or clinical practice change, nor does current research provide overwhelming 
evidence of its ability to improve critical thinking ability of bedside clinicians, assisting them to make better 
decisions faster. Although education contained relevant content and addressed specific issues identified in needs 
analyses, Fuhrmann et al. (Fuhrmann, Perner, Klausen, Østergaard, & Lippert, 2009) concluded it did not influence 
clinician awareness of ward patients at risk, nor influence the outcomes of this patient group. Further analysis needs 
to be undertaken to study the effect of these education programs on changing clinical behaviour and the application 
of learnt skills. 
 
The development of education specifically designed to teach awareness and clinical intervention of the deteriorating 
patient is still at the forefront of most RRS implementation plans. The multidisciplinary nature of many of these 
programs may have the added benefit of helping to improve team collaboration.  
Despite the availability of education programs to enhance clinical skills, very little has been published to date on 
curricula to support actual roles of responders to rapid response. Responders must also take leadership roles, 
effectively communicate with other clinicians, and in many cases, alter the current management regimes set by the 






Hospital cultures are complex, multifaceted and highly individualized. The degree of success or failure of RRS 
depends very much on a facilities adaptability and acceptance to change. It is not enough to simply introduce a rapid 
response system and expect it to work effectively and with full compliance. Van Der Weyden (Van Der Weyden, 
2009) researched the attitudes of Australian clinicians to system change. Results showed that clinicians generally do 
value the implementation & use of evidence based systems for client centred care within the context of the 
Australian health care setting. Looking more closely at cultural attitudes and behaviours within RRS, Salamonson and 
colleagues (Salamonson et al., 2006) identified nurse years of experience as a major factor in system activation. 
Experienced nurses believed the greatest benefits were getting immediate help or attention, followed by their use 
in early recognition and management of deterioration. Rapid response also provided a backup system if they were 
worried about a patient, or were not satisfied with a current medical management plan. From 2004 to 2006, the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation  funded demonstration projects in nine geographic locations to support RRS 
(Foote, 2010). Focus group evaluation with key groups at one “robust” and one “late adopter” hospital in this 
evaluation provided important information about the characteristics of rapid response teams, and a view of these 
teams ‘through the eyes of a nurse’. Their work provided new insight into what makes a rapid response team 
successful and underscores the importance of considering process issues as well as outcome issues in health system 
redesign. In ‘robust’ adopter centres where the teams were an accepted part of hospital system culture, nurses 
were confident they had a positive effect, and were activated without hesitation. The opposite seemed to be 
prevalent in more ‘challenged centres’, with nurses hesitant and more inclined to exhaust all other avenues before 
reluctantly activating a rapid response. Nurses were also worried about the attitude and level of assistance they 
would receive from rapid response team members on arrival in these later centres. Cultural leaders also played a 
part in the success of these teams in robust hospitals with both clear leadership and a ‘no option’ attitude to 
activation.  
 
Azzopardi et al. examined attitudes and barriers to the medical emergency team in an Australian tertiary paediatric 
hospital (Azzopardi, Kinney, Moulden, & Tibballs, 2011). Eighty percent of nurses and 45% of medical staff still 
preferred to contact the covering medical officer first before initiating a MET call. Jones et al. also reported that a 
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similar pathway was also followed by activators in an Australian adult setting where 72% of nurses would call the 
covering medical officer before initiating MET (Jones et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2011).  
 
There is currently limited information pertaining to the preference or confidence levels of clinicians initiating one 
type of rapid response model over another. Traditional roles of cardiac arrest teams may still be firmly embedded in 
the minds of some clinicians, causing hesitation and anxiety with activation. Comparing possible differences in levels 
of clinician comfort between activation of critical care versus admitting team models could be invaluable.  
 
Workforce culture and flexibility in any clinical environment will determine acceptance and utilisation of new 
initiatives. RRS are clearly not a substitute for astute clinical judgement, monitoring and vigilance. It is also 
important that the views of a range of providers are considered when implementing these models. Cultural barriers 
need to be removed before effective system uptake can occur unimpeded. Contemporary acute health 
environments are extremely busy, often under staffed and under skilled, leaving clinicians at all levels experiencing 
multiple pressures. Rethinking our moral obligations to patients requires the removal, or at least reduction in both 
systemic and personal barriers. Professional egos have little place in RRS success where team effort, equality and 
communication are paramount for optimal patient care.  Exploration of Inter-professional trust issues could further 
extract opinions of each profession by the other. Issues in communication are already present within the literature 
and exist between hierarchies within and between healthcare disciplines, significantly impacting on both intra and 
interdisciplinary communication in situations of patient deterioration, with possibilities of leading to delays in 
patient reviews and initiation of rapid response (Sutcliffe, Lewton, & Rosenthal, 2004). 
 
Changes in RRS models and trends, clinician skill mix and healthcare cultures may all impact on policy adherence and 
practice within healthcare facilities, shaping future research enquiry. In most Australian states, RRS are now 
governed by government initiated clinical emergency response system policies (Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Healthcare, 2012; Clinical Excellence Commission, 2013).  Despite policy development, evidence of 
non-adherence is underscoring the importance of examining implementation issues (Azzopardi et al., 2011; Jones et 
al., 2006; Jones et al., 2011).  Lack of professional accountability may be a factor in non-enforcement of policy 
related practice (Wachter & Pronovost, 2009). The NSW Ministry of Health, along with many other local, national 
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and global health authorities are slowly emerging from years of operating under cultures of ‘no blame’. Initially well 
intentioned, it may have inadvertently to a point, generated a sub culture where deficits in professional 
accountability by many health care clinicians occurs (Wachter & Pronovost, 2009). Thinking around benefits in a 
degree of blame in medical culture and promoting reporting of non-complaint clinicians is supported by several 
authors (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, 2010; Campbell & Wilkin, 2001; The Joint 
Commission, 2008). Clinicians must take professional accountability, ownership and support of the RRS as a 
contemporary tool for keeping patients under their care safe.  
 
Acceptance and uptake at clinical level is essential for success, but executive buy- in could prove an essential 
ingredient for added drive and leadership from the top. Clinical governance support helps promote acceptance, 
providing organisational solutions to barriers or issues that arise (Campbell & Wilkin, 2001). At the ward level this 
same leadership should be driven by clinical champions/leaders. Utilisation of project / program coordinators may 
help in providing operational and educational support to clinicians, assisting with understanding, implementation, 
monitoring of compliance, collection and dissemination of data and reports and a valuable resource to escalate 
identified risks to executives. Loop closure, or feedback of rapid response activity and audit reports to clinicians at 
the local level is necessary for system engagement (Jamtvendt, Young, Kristoffersen, O'Brien, & Oxman, 2006). 
Presenting and discussing relevant local data enables clinicians to analyse performance and raise awareness of 
issues that may otherwise have gone relatively unnoticed or not recognised as repeat occurrences. Feedback should 
have integration with hospital and government performance indicators and benchmarks for consistency of practice 
and reporting at all levels.  
 
Utilisation of clinician support programs through mentoring and clinical supervision by senior clinicians could assist 
with leading a culture of acceptance. Junior medical officers may benefit greatly by increased clinical supervision, 
mentoring and teaching by admitting medical officers and other staff specialists. Similarly, junior nurses by more 




Future directions  
Today’s acute care health facilities are high technology environments. These technologies are also becoming best 
practice in monitoring patient physiology for early signs of deterioration (Smith, Prytherch, Schmit, & Featherstone, 
2006; Tarassenko, Hann, & Young, 2006). Smart monitors have the capacity to continuously collect and store vital 
sign information, urine output and neurological status. They also have ability to automatically escalate a patient by 
initiating RRS (Smith et al., 2006). Potential exists for this technology to bypass ward clinicians, making both cultural 
issues that impact on escalation, as well as missed opportunities to escalate due to poor clinical skill and decision 
making, inconsequential. Removing human elements of system obstruction is on one hand positive, it then 
completely removes important subjective clinical assessment of the patient prior to system activation occurring, 
leading to a possible waste of resources and clinician time.  The impact of high rates of ‘false positive’ calls will need 
to be a focus of future studies as these automated systems become more widely accepted. 
 
Trends are beginning to focus on reducing the frequency of unnecessary rapid response calls (Williams, Cardona-
Morrell, Stevens, Bey, & Glasgow, 2017). Currently, high numbers of rapid response are seen as positive for the 
most part, demonstrating clinician engagement. Yet this same activation may suggest patients have already began 
their journey on the deterioration pathway, having been doing so for some time with haemodynamic compensation 
preventing early parameter breaches (Shappell et al., 2018). The RRS could perhaps then no longer be utilised as the 
predictor of the deteriorating patient, but rather an indicator that the patient had not been identified early enough 
as a potential risk. There is beginning discussion around development of systems and screening tools able to predict, 
upon admission, those who are more likely to require rapid response. 
 
Questioning a patient’s likelihood of increased risk, as well as the likelihood of recovery, presents itself as an ideal 
time point to consider end-of-life issues more closely for certain patient groups (Guy's and St Thomas', 2012) 
(Williams et al., 2017). Admitting medical teams are still for the most part, reluctant to have these conversations 
with their patients (Buss & Sulmasy, 1998; Clinical Excellence Commission, 2012a). In many cases when a patient 
experiences an adverse clinical event or sudden irreversible deterioration, the role of delivering this conversation is 
often left up to the responders of rapid response. Too many patients and their families still experience the mental 
and physical trauma of a resuscitation, only for the patient to be documented ‘not for cardiopulmonary 
 19 
resuscitation’ in hindsight post event. In many cases this directive would have been appropriate prior to clinical 
adverse events, based on review and discussion of patient prognosis and co-morbidities. To date, there does not 
seem to be an educational model to train rapid response teams in dealing with end of life conversation (Nelson et 
al., 2015), despite being required to regularly take on this role. They suggest these programs should include core 
components of communication about benefits, risks, and alternatives, formulation of a rapid response plan and 
preferences for resuscitation, alleviation of symptoms, attention to immediate patient and family needs and the 
emotional needs of themselves and the clinicians responsible for patient care. Our hospitals are not equally staffed 
twenty four hours a day, it is therefore imperative that we develop and implement these types of curricula for rapid 
response teams to effectively manage the needs of those who are unlikely to recover from the deterioration 
trajectory. 
 
In addition to education, clinicians can benefit from tools to assist and manage this patient group. Programs such as 
the ‘AMBER Care Bundle’ are being trialled in some NSW hospitals, providing guidance as to when and how to 
initiate conversations with patients and their families around choice of treatment deterioration occurs (Guy's and St 
Thomas', 2012). Having these conversations, leads to a more dignified and planned death process for both patients 
and clinicians. AMBER has shown to improve decision-making positively impacting on multi-disciplinary team 
communication. It has also shown increased nurse confidence in approaching medical colleagues to initiate 
discussion of treatment plans with patients and families. Early conversations avoid unnecessary use of the RRS and 
have also shown a remarkable reduction in emergency department readmission rates.  
 
In summary, this review has pointed to several areas for future investigation if RRSs are to evolve and reach their full 
potential. Organisational culture, resourcing, the impact of technology on both clinicians and patient care and 
complimentary systems to reduce RRS activation will all impact on rapid response evolution and need to be 
analysed for their impact and improvement if our current systems are to surpass their current limitations (Rihari-
Thomas, DiGiacomo, Phillips, Newton, & Davidson, 2017). This includes designing models that clinicians are 
comfortable in activating and appropriate to local socio-cultural context. The RRS, along with many other imposed 
systems, require clinicians to be prepared and supported, not just with initial implementation, but for ongoing 
sustainability. Positive and enabling cultures accepting of change are paramount if these systems are to be accepted 
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(Rihari-Thomas et al., 2017).  
 
For clinicians, using a RRS, resourcing also needs to be addressed. Evidence shows the ever growing trend into RRS 
for early intervention, yet resourcing still remains funnelled into resuscitation training and equipment. Resourcing of 
RRS Teams needs greater analysis in order to provide appropriate staffing/team mix and equipment (Rihari-Thomas 
et al., 2017). Further, the organisational cost savings that early intervention teams could bring through prevention of 
further deterioration of patients who, would otherwise, require either extensive resuscitation and / or transfers to 
expensive critical care units needs to be brought to the forefront of discussion. 
 
The growth of technology is helping to identify patient vital sign parameter breaches, yet many systems exclude 
human assessment and interaction variables (M. A. DeVita et al., 2010). Inquiry into the impact these systems are 
generating on clinicians with consequent changes in interaction with other health workers as well as job satisfaction 
and culture should be studied for effect. In addition, there is a possibility clinicians may over time give up their 
assessment skills in favour of ‘automated assessment’ as a way of easing their workload. The impact of both end of 
life and improvement in the ability clinicians to have general resuscitation discussions as part of all patient’s care 
planning, are approaches that could reduce the use of RRS, their resourcing, costs and inappropriate activation. 




This review has highlighted contemporaneous trends in the implementation of the RRS, focussing on the Australian 
setting within a context of international evidence.  
 
Dr Dana Edelson has said: “The answer to why rapid response teams haven’t been more successful is a combination 
of two things. We don’t call them often or early enough, and when we get there we don’t always do the right thing.” 
(Colwell, 2015). Future rapid response direction must include the elimination of negative human factors that impede 
their effectiveness, while promoting technology to help capture patients who might otherwise ‘slip through the net’. 
Rapid response systems are complex interventions requiring consideration of contextual factors at local levels, 
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appropriate resources, a skilled workforce and positive workplace culture before effective uptake and utilisation can 









Astroth, K., Woith, W., Stapleton, S., Degitz, R., & Jenkins, S. (2013). Qualitative exploration of nurses' 
decisions to activate rapid response teams. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 22(19-20), 6. 
doi:10.1111/jocn.12067 
Australian Capital Territory Health. (2008). Compass.   Retrieved from 
http://www.health.act.gov.au/professionals/general-information/compass. 
Australian Capital Territory Health. (2009). Policy; modified early warning scores. Canberra: ACT 
Health. 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare. (2009). Recognising and responding to 
clinical deterioration:use of observation charts to identify clinical deterioration. Sydney: 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare. 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare. (2010). National consensus statement: 
Essential elements for recognising and responding to clinical deterioration. Sydney: The 
Australian commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare. 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare. (2012). NSQHS standards. Standard 9: 
recognising and responding to clinical deterioration in acute health care. Ultimo. 
Azzopardi, P., Kinney, S., Moulden, A., & Tibballs, J. (2011). Attitudes and barriers to a medical 
emergency team system at a tertiary paediatric hospital. Resuscitation, 82(2), 167-174. 
doi:10.1016/j.resuscitation.2010.10.013 
Buist, M., Moore, G., Bernard, S., Waxman, B., Anderson, J., & Nguyen, T. (2002). Effects of a medical 
emergency team on reduction of incidence of and mortality from unexpected cardiac arrests in 
hospital: preliminary study. BMJ(324), 6.  
Buss, M., & Sulmasy, D. (1998). The preparedness of students to discuss end-of-life issues with 
patients. Academic Medicine, 1998(73), 4.  
Campbell, S., & Wilkin, D. (2001). Primary care groups: Improving the quality of care through clinical 
governance. BJM, 322(7302), 1580-1582.  
Chan, P., Jain, R., Nallmothu, B., Berg, R., & Sasson, C. (2010). Rapid response teams: A systematic 
review and meta-analysis. Archives of Internal Medicine, 170(1), 18.  
Chen, J., Ou, L., Hillman, K., Flabouris, A., Bellomo, R., Hollis, S., & Assareh, H. (2014). The impact of 
implementing a rapid response system: A comparrison of cardiopulmonary arrests and 
mortality among four teaching hospitals in Australia. Resuscitation, 85(9), 1275-1281.  
Cioffl, J. (2008). Heuristics, servants to intuition, in clinical decision making. Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, 26(1), 5.  
Clinical Excellence Commission. (2009a). Between the flags.   Retrieved from 
http://www.cec.health.nsw.gov.au/programs/between-the-flags 
Clinical Excellence Commission. (2009b). Detecting deterioration, evaluation, treatment, escalation 
and communicating in teams (DETECT).   Retrieved from 
http://www.nswhealth.moodle.com.au/DOH/DETECT/content. 
 22 
Clinical Excellence Commission. (2012a). In safe hands.   Retrieved from 
http://www.cec.health.nsw.gov.au/programs/in-safe-hands 
Clinical Excellence Commission. (2012b). Partnering with patients; REACH -patient and family 
activation.   Retrieved from http://www.cec.health.nsw.gov/programs/partnering-with-
patients 
Clinical Excellence Commission. (2013). Recognition and management of patients who are clinically 
deteriorating. .   Retrieved from 
http://www0.health.nsw.gov.au/policies/pd/2013/PD2013_049.html. 
Colwell, J. (2015). Tweaking rapid response teams: Automation, new team members improving 
outcomes at some hospitals. ACP Hospitalist. 
DeVita, M., Braithwaite, R., Mahidhara, R., Stuart, S., Foraida, M., & Simmons, R. (2004). Use of medical 
emergency team responses to reduce hospital cardiopulmonary arrests. Quality and safety in 
health care, 13(4), 4.  
DeVita, M., Smith, G., Adam, S., Adams-Pizarro, I., Buist, M., Bellomo, R., . . . Winters, B. (2010). 
Identifying the hospitalised patient in crisis - A concensus conference on the afferent limb of 
rapid response systems. Resuscitation, 81(4), 7.  
DeVita, M. A., Smith, G. B., Adam, S. K., Adams-Pizarro, I., Buist, M., Bellomo, R., . . . Goldsmith, D. 
(2010). “Identifying the hospitalised patient in crisis”—a consensus conference on the afferent 
limb of rapid response systems. Resuscitation, 81(4), 375-382.  
Douglas, N., Robinson, J., & Fahy, K. (2001). Inquiry into obstetric and gynaecological services at King 
Edward Memorial Hospital 1990-2000. Perth: Government of Western Australia. 
Driscoll A, Currey J, Allen, J., George M, & Davidson, P. (2014). New cardiac models of care reduce 
patient access to specialist nurses: A Victorian cross-sectional pilot study. Australian Critical 
Care, 27(1), 17-27.  
Elliot, S., Chaboyer, W., Ernest, D., Doric, A., & Endacott, R. (2012). A national survey of Australian 
intensive care unit (ICU) liaison nurse (LN) services. Australian Critical Care, 25(4), 9.  
Foote, S. (2010). Rapid response teams. The American Journal of Nursing, 110(9), 13.  
Fuhrmann, L., Perner, A., Klausen, T., Østergaard, D., & Lippert, A. (2009). The effect of multi-
professional education on the recogntiton and outcome of patients at risk on general wards. 
Resuscitation, 80(12), 3.  
Gale, J. (2010). Discursive analysis: A research approach for studying the moment-to-moment 
construction of meaning in systemic practice. Human Systems: The Journal of Therapy, 
Consultation & Training, 21(2), 7-37.  
Gao, H., McDonnell, A., Harrison, D., Moore, T., Adam, S., Daly, K., . . . Harvey, S. (2007). Systematic 
review and evaluation of physiological track and trigger warning systems for identifying at-
risk patients on the ward. Intensive Care Medicine, 33(4), 667-679.  
Garling, P. (2008). Final report of the special commission of enquiry: Acute care services in NSW public 
hospitals. Retrieved from Sydney:  
Guy's and St Thomas'. (2012). The amber care bundle.   Retrieved from 
www.ambercarebundle.org/documents/amber-care-bundle-a-guide-for-patients-their-
relatives-and-carer.pdf 
Harder, B. (2010). Use of simulation in teaching and learning in health sciences: A systematic review 
Journal of Nursing Education, 49(5). doi:10.3928/01484834-20090828-08. 
Hill, A., Horswill, M., Preece, M., & Watson, M. (2010). The developmenet of the adult deterioration 
detection system (ADDS) chart. Sydney: Australian Commission on safety and Quality in 
Healthcare. 
Hillman, K. (2008). Rapid response systems. Indian Journal of Critical Care Medicine: Peer-reviewed, 
official publication of the Indian Society of Critical Care Medicine, 12(2), 77.  
Hillman, K., & Braithwaite, J. (2014). Patient safety and rapid response systems. The Medical Journal of 
Australia, 201(11), 654-656.  
Hillman, K., Chen, K., Creticos, M., Bellomo, R., Brown, D., Doig, G., . . . Flabouris, A. (2005). MERIT 
study investigators, Introduction of the medical emergency team (MET) system: a cluster 
randomised controlled trial. Lancet, 365(9477), 6.  
 23 
Jacques, T., Harrison, G., McLaws, M., & Kilborn, G. (2006). Signs of critical conditions and emergency 
responses (SOCCER): A model for predicting adverse events in the inpatient setting. 
Resuscitation, 69(2), 175-183.  
Jamtvendt, G., Young, J., Kristoffersen, D., O'Brien, M., & Oxman, A. (2006). Audit and feedback: Effects 
on professional practice and health care outcomes (review). The Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews(2).  
Jones, D., Baldwin, I., McIntyre, T., Story, D., Mercer, I., Miglic, A., . . . Bellomo, R. (2006). Nurses' 
attitudes to a medical emergency team service in a teaching hospital. Quality and Safety in 
Healthcare, 15.  
Jones, D., DeVita, M., & Bellomo, R. (2011). Rapid-response teams. New England Journal of Medicine, 
365(2), 139-146.  
King, L., & Appleton, J. (1997). Intuition: A critical review of the research and rhetoric. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 26(1), 8.  
McCutcheon, H., & Pincombe, J. (2001). Intuition: An important tool in the practice of nursing. Journal 
of Advanced Nursing, 35(3), 6.  
McGaughey, J., Alderdice, F., Fowler, R., Kapila, A., Mayhew, A., & Moutray, M. (2007). Outreach and 
early warning system (EWS) for the prevention of intensive care admission and death of 
critically ill adult patients on general hospital wards. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 
(3). Retrieved from  doi:10.1002/14651858.CD005529.pub2. 
Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., & Altman, D. (2010). Preferred reporting items for systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses: The PRISMA statement. International Journal of Surgery, 8(5), 336-
341.  
Nelson, J., Mathews, K., Weissman, D., Brasel, K., Campbell, M., Curtis, R., . . . Lustbader, D. (2015). 
Integration of palliative care in the context of rapid response; A report from the improving 
palliative care in the ICU advisory board. Chest, 147(2), 560-569.  
Pham, J., Aswanj, M., Rosen, M., Lee, H., Huddle, M., Weeks, K., & Pronovost, P. (2012). Reducing 
medical errors and adverse events. Annual Review of Medicine, 63, 447-463.  
Queensland Government. (2011). Inquest into the death of Ryan Charles Saunders. (COR 4449/07(0)). 
Brisbane: Office of the State Coroner Retrieved from 1.
 www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/.../cif-saunders-rc-20111007.pdf. 
Queensland Health. (2014). Ryan's Rule.   Retrieved from 
https://www.health.qld.gov.au/cairns_hinterland/html/ryan-home.asp. 
Ranji, S., Auerbach, A., & Hurd, C. (2007). Effects of rapid response systems on clinical outcomes: 
systematic review and meta analysis. Journal of Hospital Medicine., 2(6), 422-432.  
Rihari-Thomas, J., DiGiacomo, M., Phillips, J., Newton, P., & Davidson, P. M. (2017). Clinician 
perspectives of barriers to effective implementation of a Rapid Response System in an 
academic health centre: a focus group study. International journal of health policy and 
management, 6(8), 447.  
Royal College of Physicians. (2015). National early warning score (NEWS): Standardising the 
assessment of actute-illness severity in the NHS.   Retrieved from 
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/national-early-warning-score-news 
Salamonson, Y., Heere, B., Everett, B., & Davidson, P. (2006). Voices from the floor: Nurses' 
perceptions of the medical emergency team. Intensive and Critical Care Nursing, 22(3), 138-
143.  
Santiano, N., Young, L., Hillman, K., Parr, M., Jayasinghe, S., Baramy, L., . . . Hanger, G. (2009). Analysis 
of medical emergency team calls comparive subjective to "objective" call criteria. Resuscitation, 
80(1), 5.  
Shappell, C., Snyder, A., Edelson, D. P., Churpek, M. M., & Investigators, A. H. A. s. G. W. T. G.-R. (2018). 
Predictors of in-hospital mortality after rapid response team calls in a 274 hospital nationwide 
sample. Critical care medicine, 46(7), 1041-1048.  
Smith, G., Prytherch, D., & Schmit, P. (2008). Review and performance evaluation of aggregate 
weighted 'track and trigger' systems. Resuscitation, 77, 170-179.  
 24 
Smith, G., Prytherch, D., Schmit, P., & Featherstone, P. (2006). Hospital-wide physiological surveillance 
- a new approach to the early identification and management of the sick patient Resuscitation, 
71, 19-28.  
South East Sydney Illawarra Area Health Service. (2009). Patient with acute condition for escalation 
(PACE): management of the deteriorating adult inpatient. Sydney: South East Sydney Illawarra 
Area Health Service. 
Subbe, C., Kruger, M., Rutherford, P., & Gimmel, L. (2001). Validation of a modified early warning score 
in medical admissions. QJM: an international journal of medicine, 94, 5.  
Sutcliffe, K. M., Lewton, E., & Rosenthal, M. M. (2004). Communication failures: an insidious 
contributor to medical mishaps. Academic Medicine, 79(2), 186-194.  
Tarassenko, L., Hann, A., & Young, D. (2006). Integrated monitoring and analysis for early warning of 
patient deterioration British Journal of Anaesthesia, 97(1), 64-68.  
The ANZICS-CORE MET dose Investigators. (2011). Rapid response team composition, resourcing and 
calling criteria in Australia. Resuscitation, 83(2012), 563-567.  
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2013). Australian hospital statistics 2011-12. 
Retrieved from Canberra:  
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2014). Indicators of Australia's healh. (14). Canberra: 
Australian Government. 
The Australian Resuscitation Council. (2010). Cardiac arrest-an introduction.   Retrieved from 
www.resus.org.au 
The Joint Commission. (2008). Behaviours that undermine a culture of safety. Retrieved from 
Oakbrook: http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_40.pdf 
Ulrich, R., Zimring, C., Joseph, A., & Choudhary, R. (2004). The role of the physical environment in the 
hospital of the 21st century: A once in a lifetime opportunity. Retrieved from Concord:  
Van Der Weyden, M. (2009). In the wake of the Garling inquiry into NSW public hospitals: A change of 
cultures. The Medical Journal of Australia, 190(2), 51-52.  
Wachter, R., & Pronovost, P. (2009). Balancing "no blame" with accountability in patient safety. The 
New England Journal of Medicine, 361(14), 5.  
Walker, B. (2004). Special commission of enquiry into Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals. Retrieved 
from Sydney:  
Whittemore, R., & Knafl, K. (2005). The integrative review: Updated methodology. Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, 35(5), 546-553.  
Williams, M., Cardona-Morrell, M., Stevens, P., Bey, J., & Glasgow, M. S. (2017). Timing of palliative care 
team referrals for inpatients receiving rapid response services: A retrospective pilot study in a 
US hospital. International journal of nursing studies, 75, 147-153.  
Wilson, R., Runciman, W., Gibberd, R., Harrison, B., Newby, L., & Hamilton, J. (1995). The quality in 
Australian health care study. The Medical Journal of Australia, 163(9), 458-471.  
Winters, B., & Pham, J. (2011). Rapid response sytems: A review of the evidence. In M. De Vita, R. 
Bellomo, & K. Hillman (Eds.), Textbook of Rapid Response Systems (pp. 65-78). New York: 
Springer. 
Winters, B., Pham, J., Hunt, E., Guallar, E., Berenholtz, S., & Pronovost, P. (2007). Rapid response 
systems: A systematic review. Critical Care Medicine, 35(5), 1238-1243.  
 
 
 
 
